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Because of the cultural diversity which underlies the South African 
legal system much academic effort has been, and still is being, wasted upon 
our intellectual equivalent of the Anglo-Boer War - known politely but 
misleadingly as the "purist/pragmatist debate". 1 This curious academic 
bloodsport which, it seems, is a sad but common feature of legal systems 
that have recently been subjected to colonial rule, has provided a forum in 
which lawyers of various descent have vented their frustration, even irrita-
tion, at the fact that our legal system reflects the influence of others beside 
themselves. The pastime has often prevented us from viewing the overall 
development of our legal system dispassionately; and much legal scholarship 
on both sides has been spoiled by emotional jingoism and legal chauvinism. 
Perhaps we have been too much concerned with how we would like to see 
things, and too little concerned with what we already have. This paper is an 
attempt to redress the balance, to be more constructive. I wish to place more 
emphasis upon the richness of our shared legal tradition, a richness which 
derives from the fact that it is a shared tradition. The type of study which I 
will advocate is "pure comparative law", a branch of legal science. 
Legal science, or jurisprudence, is the theoretical knowledge of law in 
all its sophisticated forms, from the a priorist to the empirico-inductivist. 
As such it embraces, on the one hand, legal philosophy (the abstract and 
general conceptualisation of law) and, on the other, the sociology of law 
(which involves the empirical study of law); and it includes a number of sub-
disciplines in between, all of which seek to furnish theoretical explanations 
concerning the nature of law and legal phenomena. Among these sub-
* Adapted from a paper presented to the Conference of the Society of University 
Teachers of Law, held at the University of the Western Cape: 13 January 1983. 
**B Com LL B (Natal) LL B Dip Leg Studies (Cantab). 
lPor a survey, see HR Hablo & Ellison Kahn The South African Legal System and its 
Background (1968) 578££; and DH van Zyl Geskiedenis van die Romeins-Hollandse Reg 
(1979) 476f'f. More recent literature is canvassed in Adrienne van Blerk's "The Irony 
of Labels" (1982) 99 SAL] 365. 
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Comparative law in a mixed legal .rystem 85 
disciplines, and touching upon all areas of legal science, is comparative law 
- a vitally important and continually increasing branch of legal knowledge. 
I submit that, because of the unusually cosmopolitan nature of our legal 
system, we are advantageously placed to contribute to this knowledge. 
What I have already said will not be accepted by everyone, including 
some comparatists; and so this paper will constitute first, a defence of the 
assertion that comparative law - or ''pure comparative law" (to avoid am-
biguity) - is a branch of legal science and a substantive discipline in its own 
right. Secondly, the mixed nature of our legal system and its significance 
for pure comparative law will be considered. Finally, I will illustrate my 
argument by way of a few selected examples. Although of primary interest 
to comparatists and jurisprudes, I would hope that what follows will be of 
interest to academic lawyers generally. 
What is "pure comparative law"? 
In order to provide the necessary context for a defence of "pure com-
parative law" it would be useful to furnish a brief outline of the development 
of comparative law. 
Historical develop!llent2 
The application of the comparative method - that is, comparing different 
legal systems, institutions or laws - is nothing new. Aristotle, Francis 
Bacon and Montesquieu were some of its better known practitioners. But 
the employment of the comparative method as a .rystematic discipline in the 
study of law really only commenced in Germany, France and England in the 
early to mid-nineteenth century, and in South Africa during the 1920'S.3 
Of course the use by South African judges and legislators of foreign law as a 
model for the development of our own law was, of necessity, already well-
established by the latter half of the nineteenth century, although it is some-
times suggested that the use of foreign law on a systematic basis was much 
more fully developed by recent judges such as the late LC Steyn.4 Courses 
in comparative law were introduced first at the University of Cape Town, 
then Potchefstroom University, Unisa, the University of Natal, and, I un-
derstand, the University of Pretoria. Perhaps most important of all was the 
establishment of the Institute of Foreign and Comparative Law at Unisa in 
1965 and the launching of the Comparative and Intemational Law journal of 
'See generally, eg, Walther Hug "The History of Comparative Law" (1932) 45 Harv L 
Rev 1027; HC Gutteridge Comparative Law: an Introduction to the Comparative Method 
of Legal S tlldy and Researcb (1949) Ch II; Konrad Zweigert & Hein Katz An Introduction 
to Comparative Law: Vol lime I: The Framework (trans by Tony Weir 1977) 41-56. 
3See W J Hosten "Romeinse Reg, Regsgeskiedenis en Regsvergelyking" (1962) 25 
THRHR 16, 24--27; DH van Zyl Begillsels van Regsvergelyking (1981) 14--16. Mention 
should also be made of the establishment, at the University of Cape Town, of a chair in 
comparative law in 1925; and, most important, the work on South African law by that 
great comparative lawyer Professor RW Lee at Oxford, most of which took place 
during the first quarter of this century. (See the tribute to him: 1958 Acta Juridica 1-6.) 
4Cf DH van Zyl "LC Steyn en Rcgsvergelyking" in DJ Joubert (red) Pelere Fonles: 
L C Steyll - Gedmkblll1del (1980) 1-4; Adrienne Evan Blerk Tbe "PI/risls" in Soulb 
African Legal Literature and their Illflue/1ce on tbe Jlldgments in tbe Appellate Division in 
Selectrd Area.r (unp\lb LLM thesis, University of Natal: 1981) 81--82. 
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86 XVI CILSA 1983 
Southern Africa in 1968. Comparative law has now come to be recognised 
as a subject worthy of study in its own right in South Mrica; and in 1981 
the first general textbook on the subject written by a South African appeared. 6 
TFhat is comparative fall)? 
Comparative law has undergone two main stages of development, and 
is now entering a third. Influenced by the developments in the biological 
sciences, linguistics and the new theories of social development during the 
nineteenth century, comparatists tended to focus, during that time, upon the 
historical development of legal systems in the belief that there exist certain 
laws of social development common to all societies. Here the work of 
Henry Maine, Professor of Historical and Comparative Jurisprudence at 
Oxford, and John Wigmore in the United States may be recalled. Wigmore 
called this form of comparative law "comparative nomogenetics". 6 At the 
same time the period of relative tranquility in Europe towards the end of the 
nineteenth century inspired the Frenchmen, Lambert and Saleilles, who were 
motivated by a desire for the world unification of law, to advocate enthu-
siastically the search for the "common stock of legal solutions" from 
amongst the legal systems of the civilized world. 7 Thus it was not unnatural 
that, at the ;:urn of the century, many comparatists saw comparative law as a 
substantive subject, with a self-contained subject-matter. It was mainly con-
cerned with discovering the patterns of development and concepts which 
were common to all nations. The English title, "comparative law", and the 
French, droit compare, seemed perfectly appropriate, and "comparative law" 
was seen to be a substantive science. 
During the first half of this century, however, many comparative 
lawyers (most notably Sir Frederick Pollock, HC Gutteridge and his one-
time student, Rene David) came to regard these titles as misnomers because, 
so they argued, "comparative law" was no more than a method to be em-
ployed for diverse purposes in the study of law. They observed that the 
German name for the subject, "rechtsvergleichung" - and, by implication, its 
6DH van Zyl Beginsels van Regsvergelyking (1981). 
6JH Wigmore A Panorama oj the World's Legtll Systems (in three volumes: 1936) Ch 
XVII esp at 1121. Maine's principal work was Ancient Law (1885). Cf also A Koeourek 
& JH Wigmore (compilers) Formative Injluences oj Legal Development (1918, rep 1979). 
Although the theory of universal patterns of social development in its more extravagant 
form has long been discredited, a similar but more sophisticated approach to com-
parative law finds a strong modern adherent in the person of Alan Watson: see espe-
cially hig Legal Trails plants (1974) Ch 1, and "Comparative Law and Legal Change" 
(1978) 37 Cambridge LJ 312, 317-321. Taken on its own (Marxist) terms, an outstanding 
work on comparative law which seeks to extrapolate theories of legal development is 
that by Gy Earsi Comparative Civil (Private) Law: Law Types, Law Groups, The Roads 
of Legal Development (1979). 
7Eg Zweigert & Katz op cit (n 2) 2-3. The more sophisticated modern counterpart is the 
famous 'common core' research undertaken at Cornell under the leadership of Rudolf 
Schlesinger: see RB Schlesinger "The Common Core of Legal Systems - An Emerging 
Subject of Comparative Study" in Kurt Nadelmann, Arthur T von Mehrin & John N 
Hazard (eds) XXth Century Comparative alld Conflicts Law - Legal Essays in HOllour oj 
Hessel E Yllt6ma (1961) 65, his Comparative Law 4ed (1980) 36ff, and the references 
there cited. 
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Comparative law in a mixed legal system 87 
Afrikaans counterpart, "regsvergelyking"8 - was more apt, since it in-
dicated that comparative law was an activity and not a substantive discipline 
in its own right. As Gutteridge argued, unlike "family law" or "maritime 
law", "not only are there no 'comparative' rules of law but there are no 
transactions or relationships which can be described as comparative". 9 
Echoing Gutteridge, the great comparative lawyer, Sir Otto Kahn-Freund, 
commenced his inaugural lecture as Professor of Comparative Law at 
Oxford by saying: 10 
"A professor of comparative law enjoys privileges which should make him an ob-
ject of envy among his colleagues, and he bears burdens which should evoke 
their sympathy. The trouble is that the subject which he professes has by com-
mon consent the somewhat unusual characteristic that it does not exist." 
"Comparative law" was, on this view, no more than a means to an end; 
and it was therefore the purposes for which the comparative method was to be 
employed that should form the basis of any definition of comparative law 
insofar as it existed as a "subject".l1 Thus the emphasis was transferred to 
the uses to which the comparative method could be put in law. This tendency 
was not entirely unconnected with the fact that the new discipline had to 
demomtrate its "practical utility" in order to justify its entry into an already 
overcrowded law school curriculum. The result is that most introductory 
textbooks on comparative law commence with a careful recitation of all the 
uses to which comparative law might be put,12 as if their authors were 
petrified (probably with great justification) that if the reader were not en-
ticed by the lure of material reward, preferably money, the books would not 
be read at all. By focussing on these "uses" or "purposes", comparative law-
yers divided their activities into categories which Were given labels almost as 
silly as the names given to the months of the year in Revolutionary France. 
They were: "descriptive comparative law" 13 or "comparative nomo-
scopy",14 which signified the mere description of foreign law; "applied 
comparative law",16 or "comparative legislation"18 - the use of foreign 
SCf Van Zyl op cit (n 5) 4. 
DGutteridge op cit (n 2) 1. 
lO"Comparative Law as an Academic Subject" (1966) 82 LQR 40, 40--41. Cf Professor 
JF Garner's confident assertion: "Comparative law is, of course, not a subject but a 
method", in his "The Use of the Comparative Method in University Courses in Law" 
(1971) 11 ]SPTL 134, 134. 
llGutteridge op cit (n 2) 5. 
12For all these uses, see eg M Rotondi (ed) Aims alld Methods of Comparati,e Law (1973); 
WJ Kamba "Comparative Law: A Theoretical Framework" (1974) 23 ICLQ 485, 
490-505; G Winterton "Comparative Law Teaching" (1975) 23 Am] Comp Law 
69, 97-116; Zweigert & Katz op cit (n 2) 10-23; Rene David & John EC Brierly 
Major Legal Systems ill tae World Today 2ed (1978) 3-10; Van Zyl op cit (n 5) 17-34. 
USee Edouard Lambert Encyclopaedia of th, Social Sciences Vol 3 (1930) s v "Comparative 
Law" 126. Gutteridge (op cit (n 2) 8-9) was prepared to recognise this branch of com-
parative law only if it went beyond mere description and the furnishing of information; 
and today most comparative lawyers do not recognise the mere study of foreign law as 
a part of comparative law proper: eg Watson Legal Transplants 4. 
14Wigmore op cit (n 6) 1120. 
l5Gutteridge op cit (n 2) 9. 
lBCf Gutteridge id at 2, 7. Lambert (op cit (n 13)) uses the term to refer to what was called 
"comparative jurisprudcncc", or "abstract or speculative comparative law" (sec below 
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88 XVI CILSA 1983 
law for the purpose of reforming one's own law; "comparative nomothe-
tics",17 which was primarily concerned with evaluating foreign law; "com-
parative history of law"18 or "comparative nomogenetics"19 - concerned 
with tracing the evolution of legal rules and institutions; and "abstract or 
speculative comparative law"20 or "comparative jurisprudence"21 - in 
which the comparative method was designed to assist legal philosophers 
and sociologists. Of these branches, only the last was recognised as having 
any substantive content at all, and even this recognition was tinged with 
great scepticism. So the leading textbook on comparative law, Gutteridge's, 
was and purported to be no more than a book about the correct employment 
of and advantages to be gained by the comparative method. 22 "Comparative 
law" - possessed of a number of sub-branches bearing pseudo-scientific 
titles, studied by a growing number of jurists and considered to be of in-
creasing importance - was, then, a mislabelled subject whose very existence 
was denied by its own adherents I Surely the most interesting exercise in 
ruthless intellectual self-denial we have witnessed? 
But the debate between those who argued that comparative law was a 
science and those who asserted that it was only a method was, like so many 
academic disagreements, based upon mutual misunderstandings. The two 
views, far from being contradictory, were really compatible23 - so long as 
each side's perspective was taken into account. During the process of the 
debate, however, the stridency of the "methodists" did much harm to the 
image of comparative law as a substantive, scientific discipline and it has 
not received the attention it has deserved; at least until recently. It is this 
aspect to which I now turn. 
"Pure" comparative law 
Comparative law, contrary to the view of the "methodists", does exist, 
not as an inappropriate title for a form of activity, but as a steadily expanding 
body of substantive knowledge quite independent from the uses to which 
this knowledge might be put or the method by which the knowledge is 
compiled. It exists as a pure discipline worthy of scholarly academic pursuit; 
and, to emphasise the point, I have borrowed the adjective used by Ernst 
Rabel24 and have called the subject "pure comparative law". 
Let me justify these assertions. 
It seems to me that the "methodists" and the "scientists" really shared 
at nn 20--21). 
l1Wigmore op cit (n 6) 1120. 
18Lambert op cit (n 13) 127. 
19Wigmore op cit (n 6) 1121. 
20Gutteridge op cit (n 2) 9-10. 
21Lambert op cit (n 13) 127. 
22Gutteridge op tit (n 2). 
23Borislav T Blagojevic "Le Droit Compare - Methode ou Science" (1953) 5 Revue 
de Droit Intemotional et de Droit Compart! 649. 
24Rabel drew a distinction between "pure comparative law" ("Reine Rechtsllergleichung") 
and the use of the results ("die Wertung"): see M Schmitthoff "The Science of Compara-
tive Law" (1939~1) 7 Cambridge LJ 94, 96; Gutteridge op cit (n 2) 9-10. 
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Comparative law in a mixed legal .rystem 89 
different points of reference, even though the former appreciated implicitly 
what the latter were prepared to recognise explicitly. When speaking of 
"rules" and "laws", the methodists had in mind normative "rules" or "laws" 
- the things we lawyers are brought up on. The scientists, on the other hand, 
were more concerned with descriptive rules or the laws of human behaviour. 
They perceived law primarily as a social phenomenon, and the relationship 
between law and society to be governed by "rules" or "laws" which tran-
scend anyone particular legal system. Perhaps lingering on \Jas something 
of the distinction in perspective between the "lawyer" and the "jurist", the 
former regarding the latter, expecially in England, with great scepticism 
and even derision. 25 There is a delightful article in an old issue of the Journal 
of the Society of Public Teachers of LaJlJ, entitled "How to Become a Jurist", 26 
which illustrates this. In it the President of the Society poked fun at the 
pretensions of those who style themselves "jurists". Jargon, other world-
liness and eccentricity were deemed essential for the role. And compa-
rative lawyers, I am afraid, like to regard themselves as jurists. 
Given their different conception of "laws" and "rules", it is not sur-
prising that the methodists were able to make fun of the scientists. They 
argued, as you will recall, that because there were no such things as "com-
parative transactions" or "comparative rules of law", there could be no 
subject accurately called "comparative law"; and in doing so they had in 
mind normative rules. Of course the argument is perfectly ccrrect; but the 
"scientists" never confined themselves to normative rules. The "rules" 
they sought were descriptive and explanatory ones. Hence to criticise them 
on the basis used by the "methodists" was absurd. There are no "compara-
tive plants" either, yet comparative biology constitutes an important body 
of scientific knowledge as does comparative anatomy, comparative philology 
and comparative religion. Indeed, the sort of substantive knowledge gene-
rated by the comparative method is so substantial in some of these disciplines 
that the adjective "comparative" has been dispensed with anll_ the compara-
tive method is simply taken for granted as an indispensible method of in-
quiry. Nor is the matter altered by the fact that the comparative method 
produces results which are found to be of great and varied practical use: 
no one would suggest that applied physics precludes the existence of pure 
physics. 27 
25Cf W] Wagner "Research in Comparative Law: Some Theoretical Implications" in 
RA Newman (ed) Ersa)'S in ]Nrisprudence in Honour oj Roscoe Pound (1962, rep 1973) 
511, 513--4. 
UAnonymous (1963) 2]SPTL 129. 
27These points are much more powerfully and elegantly made by Jerome Hall Comparative 
Law and Social Theory (1963) 12ft Cf also Max Rheinstein "Comparative Law - its 
Functions, Methods and Uses" (1968) 22 Arkansas L Rev 415 (reprint~d in Rotondi op 
,it (n 12) 545, 554): "But what are we to do with the results of our [comparative 1 
endeavours? Of what use are they, if any? 
Being a professor, I would state first the usefulness our insights have in and by them-
selves. They are answers, mostly tentative ones, to man's insatiable quest for knowing 
his world. They are as valuable or as useless as the insights obtained in such sciences 
as comparative religion, comparative linguistics, biology or physics. They simply 
satisfy our curiosity." 
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90 XVI CILSA 1983 
Understood from their own perspective, then, a definition of com-
parative law in terms of its method and its usefulness is as useless to the 
"scienti~t" of comparative law as is a definition of Christianity which says 
that it is something people go to church for in order to be saved; or a defini-
tion of physics which say~ it is the systematic use of electron microscopes 
and cathode ray tubes in order to make electric razors. Such definitions take 
for granted the thing they set out to define. 
In fact, the "methodists" give the game away whenever they advocate 
the use of the comparative method at all. For one might immediately ask, 
"why the comparative method?"; "what does it tell us that other methods 
do not?" The answer becomes apparent when we consider what occurs as 
a result of comparison. At its crudest level - hardly comparison at all but 
rather a peek at foreign institutions - the researcher simply collects ideas. 
More often than not these ideas play the role of stimulating partial or com-
plete imitation (or rejection) in the process of law reform or doctrinal 
criticism. It is at this level that so much that passes under the label of "com-
parative law" remains. There is nothing necessarily wrong with this, since 
it seems that ideas play the dominant role in the proces~ of law reform, 28 
but it is small wonder, therefore, that the substantive content of comparative 
law is so often missed. 
Serious comparative law commences at a more sophisticated level, that 
of comparison itself. "What does he know of England who only England 
knows?" asked Kipling,29 and Mathew Arnold "used to say that one who 
knew only his Bible knew not his Bible."30 The process of comparison is 
such a fundamental part of our cognitive development that it is difficult 
to conceive of any form of general knowledge without it. 31 From the day 
we are born we compare; we learn what is distinctive about an orange by 
looking at what is not an orange, what is a boy by looking at what is a girl 
(vive la difference I). A1!}thing can be compared except those things that are 
identical. This also applies to legal systems, institutions, doctrines and rules. 
Here the "methodists" reveal their preoccupation with "practical" results, 
such as law reform, by their emphasis on "comparability" - that certain 
legal systems and rules are not comparable 'With others.32 It used to be 
18Cf below at nn 60-61. 
29Quoted by Richard HS Tur "The Dialectic of General Jurisprudence and Comparative 
Law" 1977 Juridical Review 238,247. 
a8Quoted by Roscoe Pound "What May We Expect from Comparative Law-" (1936) 
22 Am Bar Assoc J 56, 60. Cf Wagner op tit (n 25) 512. 
SlSee especially Hall op cit (n 27) 20; and cf RH Graveson "Philosophy and Function in 
Comparative Law" (1958) 7 ICLQ 649, 652: "I belieTe that comparison is one of the 
most important paths taken by the human mind toward general understanding. In 
fact 1 venture to say that comparison is a process of human thought that no one can ever 
escape except in the narrow sphere of pure instinct, and one may indeed perceive the 
function of comparison even in the field of instinct." 
210n comparability, see eg Schmitthoff op cit (n 24) 96; DA Loeber "Rechtsvergleichung 
zwischen Llinder mit verschiedener Wirtschaftsordnung" 1961 Rabels Zeitschrift 
fur auslondischer und internationaJer Priviltrtcht 201; Stefan M Grzybowski "Le But des 
Recherches et les Methodes des Travaux sur Ie Droit Compare" in Rotondi op cit 
(n 12) 317, 331-332; Viktor Knapp "Quelques Problcmes Methodologiques dans la 
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ComparatilJe law in a mixed legal D'stem 91 
suggested that socialist law could not be compared with capitalist law be-
cause of their mutually incompatible economic bases. But this is only true 
if we are concerned with comparison for the purpose of legal transplantation. 
If we want to understand the role played by economic substructures, for 
example, then comparison between the two makes perfectly good sense, 
although the results will be of greater interest to the jurist than the lawyer. 33 
What, then, is the body of knowledge which is generated by the appli-
cation of the comparative method? This depends upon the degree of sophis-
tication of the method employed. 34 At its simplest level - that of the de-
scription of differences and similarities - we merely acquire greater under-
standing of the characteristic features of particular rules or institutions. But, 
as the method becomes more sophisticated - for example, where the socio-
economic structures, historical background and cultural patterns which 
underly the rules or institutions are taken into account, or where more 
flexible criteria of comparison are adopted - the comparative method begins 
to produce explanatory principles, even rules, based on interrelated variables; 
explanations which become progressively more scientific and predictive in 
nature. 35 
Pure comparative law can never, though, become as rigorously disci-
plined a science as the physical sciences. In the first place, it cannot attain the 
same degree of objectivity. The complex pattern according to which human 
institutions including legal institutions evolve renders a study of their unique 
historical development essential for proper understanding. In this respect, 
the biological sciences provide a closer analogy. 36 In the second place, 
the same degree of predictive certainty is unlikely. The physical sciences 
seek to establish universal rules on the basis of the relationship between very 
few variables; and these can be established under controlled conditions and 
through experimentation. On the other hand, pure comparative law, like 
all social sciences, has to deal with very complex phenomena: humans and 
human institutions. Wide religious, cultural and social diversities, not to 
mention the influence of particular individuals, produce distinctive legal 
Science du Droit Compare" in Rotondi op cit 425, 429--430; Zweigert & Katz op cit 
(n 2) 25-33; Micheal Bogdan "Different Economic Systems and Comparative Law" 
(1978) 2 Comparative Law Yearbook 89, 93-99; and Van Zyl op cit (n 5) 39. 
sSAlthough the continuing socialization of law has rendered even Soviet law useful for 
Western law reformers: see eg Zsolt Szirmai "The Use of Soviet Civil Law for the 
Western Lawmaker" in Rotondi op cit (n 12) 657. An outstanding example of the 
derivation of social theory by means of the comparison of widely divergent societies 
and their legal systems (ancient feudal China, feudal, post feudal and modern Europe 
and Nazi Germany) is Roberto Mangabeira Unger's La,v in Modem Socie~)' (1976). 
84The literature on method is vast: see e g Gutteridge op cit (n 2) passim; Rotondi op cit 
(n 12) passim; Imre Zajtay "Aims and Methods of Comparative LlIw" (trans by WJ 
Hosten) (1974) 7 CILSA 321; Zweigert & Katz op cit (n 2) 23--41; and Van Zyl opcit 
(n 5) 35--43. 
85See especially John Henry Merryman "Comparative Law and Scientific Explanation" 
in J Hazard & W Wagner (eds) Law in the United States of America in Social and Tech-
nological Revolution (1974) 82 (reprinted in John Henry Merryman & David S Clark 
Comparative Law: Western European and Latin American Legal Systems (1978) 24). 
36See generally Hall op cit (n 27) Ch 2. 
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92 XVI CILSA 1983 
systems, each of which must be understood on their own, even if some or all 
manifest similar traits. Thus Verstehen, the sort of knowledge more closely 
associated with art and history, the knowledge of the particular as opposed 
to knowledge of the general, is important to the understanding of law and 
legal institutions; and although legal sociology might strive toward a 
universalist knowledge of law, as does legal philosophy in a different sense, 
pure comparative law is forever bound to a limbo between the general and 
the particular. 37 
Furthermore, pure comparative law is distinctive among the branches 
of legal science in that it is sustained primarily by the comparative method,38 
whereas other branches may place greater emphasis upon the many other 
methods of cognition which exist, such as empirical induction or a priorist 
speculation. Thus although comparative law is sometimes identified with 
legal sociology,39 it is really more confined. Naturally it does, however, 
support the other branches of legal science and is itself supported by them. 40 
It is this conception of comparative law, rather than the use of foreign 
law simply for stimulating law reform, that I believe to be of special interest 
in a mixed legal system. 
Mixed legal systems and pure comparative law 
A good working definition of a mixed legal system is that by ] oseph 
McKnight who described them as "those [systems] having substantive 
attributes (and those of method) derived from two or more systems generally 
37Hall (id 33) defines comparative law thus: "Comparative law is a composite of social 
knowledge of positive law distinguished by the fact that, in its general aspect, it is 
intermediate between the knowledge of particular laws and legal institutions, on the 
one side, and the universal knowledge of them at the other extreme." See also his 
"Comparative Law as Basic Research" (1980) 4 Hastings Int'l alld Comp L Rev 189, 
199-200, where the knowledge generated by comparative law is described as "inter-
mediate" or "taxonomic"; and Imre Szabo "Theoretical Questions of Comparative 
Law" in I Szabo & Z Peteri A Socialist Approach to Comparative Law (1977) 9, 23, 
where comparative law is described as "transitory or intermediary science" in the sense 
that it provides only an incomplete theory of law. Cf Max Rheinstein "Teaching Tools 
in Comparative Law" (1952) 1 Am] Comp L 95, 98-99. 
38Szabo op cit (n 37) 27-29. 
39Eg Rheinstein op cit (n 37) 98: " ... when its cultivator tries to observe, describe, 
classify, and investigate in their relations among themselves and to other phenomena, 
the phenomena of law. Comparative law in that sense is the observational and exacti-
tude-seeking science of law in general ... ". It is not really possible to draw a satis-
factory distinction between comparative law and legal sociology, mainly because the 
comparative method is so predominant a means of cognition that legal sociology itself 
relies heavily upon it. Much depends upon one's point of focus. Cf, generally, Hall op cit 
(n 27) Ch 2; Radomir D Lukic "Les Methodes Sociologiques en Droit Compare" 
in Rotondi op cit (n 12) 453; Stefan Rozmaryn "Les Grandes Controverses du Droit 
Compare" in Rotondi op cit 577, 590-591; Konrad Zweigert "The Sociological Dimen-
sion of Comparative Law" (1976) 14 Law and State 44; David & Brierly op cit (n 12) 
12-13; Zweigert & Katz op cit (n 2) 9-10. 
4°For sociological jurisprudence, the comparative method produces information in an 
analogous manner to that of the process known as "recoupment" which is useful where 
it is not possible to test hypothesis by experimentation: see Pierre Lepaulle "The 
Function of Comparative Law with a Critique of Sociological Jurisprudence" (1921-2) 
35 Harv L Rev 838, especially 831ff: "Recoupment is the method of verifying an hypo-
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Comparative law in a mixed legal system 93 
recognised as independent of others".41 Although one still hears our legal 
system described as "Roman-Dutch", it is surely clear to all those who view 
the system as a whole that this label is an anachronism, remaining literally 
valid at the most formal level only, and then probably only with regard to 
private law. 42 Our modern "Roman-Dutch" law is really a blend of institu-
tions, procedures, concepts, doctrines and rules inherited from Holland 
and England or developed locally, added to which is a significant element 
of indigenous law. Our system as a whole is therefore well and truly "mixed", 
and as such joins the many other mixed or "hybrid" legal systems such as 
those of Scotland, Sri Lanka, Quebec and Louisiana. 43 In fact the attempt to 
classify the numerous mixed legal systems, and the very fact that they have 
to be treated as "exceptions" in terms of the orthodox methods of classi-
fying legal systems, contributes much to the growing "theory" of legal 
families which has become popular among comparatists in recent years, 44 
and they demonstrate that there is no single set of criteria upon which to 
found the classification. The failure of existing classifications to account for 
the significant number of "mixed" exceptions forces the proponents of 
these classificatory systems to recognise their own particular premises and 
shortcomings. Indeed, if consideration is given not only to the mixed nature 
of our private law but also to our public law, our political and raciallegisla-
cion, and to the coexistence of a significant body of indigenous customary 
law alongside the main body of our law, I believe that close analysis of our 
legal system as a coherent whole will confirm a belief among some com-
parative lawyers that a more useful basis of classification of legal families is 
the socio-economic structure underlying legal systems, and not the super-
ficial characteristics of the particular legal systems themselves. 45 
thesis by successive observation of the same phenomenon from different angles." 
On the relationship between comparative law, sociological jurisprudence and legal 
philosophy, see Hall op cil (n 27) passim; CM Campbell "Comparative Law: its Current 
Definition" 1966 juridical Review 150, 168; and Tur op cil (n 29). 
u"Some Historical Observations on Mixed Systems of Law" 1977 juridical Review 177. 
"Professor Hosten argues persuasively that, in the area of classical private law at least, 
the Roman-Dutch concepts and principles of classification are sufficiently fundamental 
to warrant the label "Roman-Dutch" and its retention: W] Hosten "The Permanence 
of Roman Law Concepts in South African Law" (1969) 2 CILSA 192. 
43See eg Hahlo & Kahn op &il (n 1) 578-596; Van Zyl op cil (n 5) 284-296; A]GM Sanders 
"The Characteristic Features of South AfriClln Law" (1981) 14 CILSA 328. On the 
extent of the influence of English law. in particular, on South African law, see B Beinart 
"The English Legal Contribution in South Africa: the Interaction of Civil and Common 
Law" 1981 A&la juridica 7. For an excellent survey of mixed legal systems in general, 
see Schlesinger Comparative Law 306-321. 
Ulmre Zajtay "Reflexions sur l'evolution du Droit Compare" in H Bernstein, Ulrich 
Drobnig & Hein Kotz (eds) FeslJ&hrijl fur Konrad ZWligerl zum 70 Geburlslag (1981) 
595, 600. For general discussions reflecting the various approaches to the classification 
of legal families, see eg Ake Malmstrom "The System of Legal Systems" (1969) 13 
Scandinavian Siudies in La))) 127; Zweigert & Katz op &il (n 2) 57-67; Eorsi op fil (n 6) 
31-61; Schlesinger op &il (n 43) 303-328; Folke Schmidt "The Need for a Multi-Axial 
Method in Comparative Law" in Bernstein ellli op cil 525. 
USee Hall op cil (n 27) 93-104; and cf Earsi loc &il (n 44). In dealing with mixed systems, 
close attention would have to be paid to the way in which the mixes have taken place, 
at the level of institutions, doctrine, individual rules themselves, or whole sub-systems 
of law: cf McKnight op cil (n 41) 179-182; and, of course, a careful distinction must 
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94 XVI CILSA 1983 
The significance of mixed or hybrid legal systems for the study of com-
parative law has frequently been noted by comparative lawyers. 46 I remem-
ber vividly the remark made to me by a professor in comparative law when I 
was about to return from my studies in England. He knew I shared his 
interest in comparative law, and he said: "You are returning to South 
Africa. How fortunate you are to be able to work in a mixed legal system!" 
Specialist publications on mixed legal systems have begun to appear;47 and, 
although lately hampered by the viscissitudes of politics, the close affinity 
between Scottish and South African law has given rise to a number of 
studies comparing these two systems with particular reference to the mixed 
nature of their laws. 48 Emphasis has, however, usually been placed upon the 
mixed nature of these systems either for the purpose of identifying "impuri-
ties" for eradication,49 or as interesting exceptions to the categories of law 
"families". My interest, following that of Professor Alan Watson - who, 
incidentally, is a strong advocate of comparative law as a substantive, 
academic discipline50 - is rather with the contribution to the theory of law 
which the remarkable process of mixing of laws might provide. What is 
particularly significant for comparative law about the fact that a legal system 
is a mixed one is that, whereas the potential relationship between two se-
parate legal systems must, for as long as they remain separate, always be a 
matter for speculation and tentative conjecture, in a mixed legal system two 
separate legal systems are related; their blending has already occurred. Thus 
we are able, through the luxurious certitude of observation, to examine how 
the blend occurred, wf?y it did so, and what effect it has had upon the legal 
system itself and those regulated by it. These are questions which are all 
particularly important for the theoretical understanding of law as a social 
phenomena.. 51 And to produce satisfactory results, the comparative method 
is of paramount importance since a sound knowledge of the donor systems is 
be drawn between legal dualism or pluralism (where laws of different origin operate 
side by side), and mixed laws (where the different laws have been blended together): 
cf MB Hooker Legal Pluralism: An Introduction to Colonial and Neo Colonial Laws (1975). 
48Eg FH Lawson "The Field of Comparative Law" (1949) 61 juridical Review 16, 25 
(reprinted in FH Lawson Selected Euays, Vol 11: The Comparison (1977) 2, to-11) 
where it is pointed out that the ardent uniEcationist, Levy-Ullmann, regarded mixed 
legal systems "as the most likely focus around which a future uniform law of the world 
might group itself"; RW Parsons "Modern South African Law as a Field of Compara-
tive Study" (1951-3) 2 Un of Western Amtra/ia Lj 56; Kamba op cit (n 12) 499; Watson 
Legal Transplants passim. 
41Eg Joseph Dainow (ed) The Role of judicial Decisions and Doctrine in Civil Law and in 
Mixed jurisdictions (1974); AG Chloros Codification in a Mixed jurisdiction (1977). 
4BEg TB Smith "The Common Law Cuckoo: Problems of 'Mixed' Legal Systems with 
Special Reference to Restrictive Interpretations in the Scots Law of Obligations" 
1956 Butterworths SA Law Rev 147 and "Scots Law and Roman-Dutch Law: A Shared 
Tradition" 1959 Acta juridica 36 (reprinted in TB Smith Studies Critical and Comparative 
(1962), at 89 and 46 respectively); and Watson op cit (n 46) passim, especially Chs 7 and 
13. The other obvious example is, of course, Sri Lanka: see eg LJM Coo ray "The 
Reception of Roman-Dutch law in Sri Lanka" (1974) 7 CILSA 295. 
49This is particularly evident in the work of Professor Smith (see note 48). Cf also the 
review of his British justice: The Scottish Contribution in (1963) 7 jSPTL 137. 
60See his Legal Transplants Ch 1; and "Comparative Law and Legal Change" (1978) 
37 Cambridge Lj 313, 316-321. 
nCf Richard L Abel "Comparative Law and Social Theory" (1978) 26 Am j Comp L 219. 
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Comparative law in a mixed legal .fYItem 9S 
required in order to properly comprehend the metamorphosis which the 
transplanted laws undergo during the blending process. Now it is true that, 
being a human phenomena, some evaluation of the desirability of the way in 
which the law has been received and developed is impossible to avoid; but 
to my mind a good deal more objectivity and dispassionate analysis than has 
been exhibited in the past is required if we are to develop legal theory in a 
scholarly fashion. 
Some illustrations of pure comparative law in a mixed jurisdiction 
I shall conclude by illustrating my argument with a few examples of 
pure comparative law as it could be developed in South Africa. Apart from 
their potential contribution to the theory of legal families already mentioned, 
it seems to me that mixed legal systems offer a unique opportunity for testing 
a number of hypotheses concerning the theory of legal development - a major 
concern of pure comparative law. 52 I have chosen three theoretical issues: 
the compatibility of Roman-Dutch and English law; the transplantability 
of legal rules or institutions; and the adaptability of fundamental legal 
institutions. 
The compatibility of English and Roman-Dutch law 
That mixed legal systems exist at all is remarkable, since it illustrates 
the adaptability of law to the environments in which it has to exist. The easy 
reception of English as well as Roman-Dutch law in South Africa has some-
times been ascribed to the mutual compatibility of so many English and 
Roman-Dutch rules, principles and doctrines. On the other hand, it has 
frequently been argued that, for the future development of our law, resort 
should be had to "those systems of the West European continent which, 
though codified, have their roots in the same historical soil as our law";53 
and this advice has certainly been followed in a number of recent decisions 
by our Appellate Division, especially in criminal law. 54 But, while it is 
wise to heed the warnings issued against too readily assuming that English 
and Roman-Dutch law are similar,55 is the basis of the assumption that we 
should automatically look to modern West European law itself sound? 
I do not think that one can give an unqualified answer either way, but one 
thing cannot be ignored and that is the fact that the symbiotic absorption 
of Roman-Dutch and English law seems to indicate something of their 
similarity. Has it ever been considered that Roman-Dutch law might actually 
be closer to English law than to modern West European law? Startling 
though this proposition might sound, there is considerable support for it in 
5:lThe two most interesting works in this regard are Alan Watson's Legal Transplants; 
and Gy Eorsi's Comparative Civil (Private) Law, the latter constituting a much more 
substantial work than the former. Note also the trenchant criticisms of Watson's 
method as expressed in a book review of another of Watson's publications (Society 
and Legal Change (1977)) by Richard L Abel: "Law as Lag: Inertia as a Social Theory 
of Law" (1982) 80 Michigan L Rev 785. 
53Maisel v Van Naeren 1960 4 SA 836 (C) at 847. See also the references cited in Hahlo & 
Kahn op cit (n 1) 591 at n 33. 
HCf Van B1erk op cit (n 4) 82. 
65Eg heller v Jordaan 1956 1 SA 483 (A) at 504; Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk " Eksteen 
1954 3 SA 402 (A) at 410--411. 
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96 XVI CILSA 1983 
Marxist comparative analysis. In terms of this analysis both English and 
Roman-Dutch law are classified together, and separated from contemporary 
European law. They are treated as products of "early" capitalist revolutions 
in wruch class-compromises were reached which did not remove all the 
vestiges or values of feudalism and which did not fully incorporate the 
methods and values of rationalism. These were only adopted later during the 
radical bourgeois revolutions from whence emerged the codified law of 
modern France, the Netherlands and many other countries. 56 According to 
this same analysis, modern West German law is even more remote, being 
the product of a so-called "retarded bourgeois revolution" which produced 
even greater divergencies from the Romano-Germanic, Roman-Dutch 
law. 57 
It may turn out that such an hypothesis may be too facile. Still, it seems 
sufficiently plausible to me to warrant much closer attention. 
The transplantability of laws 
Legal transplantation for the purposes of law reform has become very 
popular worldwide, and in the process a number of hypotheses concerning 
the transplantability of laws have been proposed. Recently an apparent dif-
ference of opinion emerged between Alan Watson, the Scottish comparatist, 
and the late Sir Otto Kahn-Freund. The latter asserted that borrowing from 
foreign law for the purpose of law reform was less likely to be successful in 
the domain of public law than in private law. 58 The reason for this, he said, 
was that the institutions of public law and the administration of justice were 
reflections of the political heart - in particular the distribution of political 
power - of the donor country; and that whereas geographical, cultural and 
religious factors - which had been important in Montesquieu's time - were 
now receding obstacles to legal transplantation, political factors were, to an 
ever increasing extent, now the ones which divided nations. By way of illus-
tration he cited the unsuccessful attempt to import American labour law 
into Britain, the unsuccessful advocacy of the system of French adminis-
trative courts for England and the failure of the British jury system on the 
Continent as illustrations of unsuccessful public law transplants. On the 
other hand, he cited the widespread reform of divorce law according to 
similar patterns, despite religious objections, as an example of the diminish-
ing influence of religious and cultural factors. His conclusion, therefore, 
was: 59 
"Anyone contemplating the use of foreign legislation for law making in his country 
must ask himself: how far does this rule or institution owe its existence or its 
continued existence to a di:;;tribution of power in the foreign country which we 
do not share?" 
This seemed to contradict the views already expressed by Watson, 60 and, 
&8Eorsi op cit (n 46) 111-156. 
17ld 156ff 
&8"On Us'es and Misuses of Comparative Law" (1974) 37 Modern L Rev. 1. 
uld 12. 
80Legal Transplants, esp ch 16. 
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Comparative law in a mixed legal system 97 
in a rejoinder,81 Watson denied that any knowledge of the power structure 
of the donor country was necessary, although it might help. According to 
him, all that was necessary was the borrowed idea, together with a know-
ledge of one's own country's power structure. Obviously the difference in 
opinion could be crucial in determining the method to be adopted, for 
example, by law reform commissions searching for foreign ideas. 
When we turn to South Africa to examine the strength of these hypo-
theses, the balance, I think, lies on the side of Alan Watson, although it may 
be that in some respects both Watson and Kahn-Freund are arguing at cross-
purposes. 62 And the institutions which I have in mind for testing their 
respective hypotheses are our constitution (imported from England but 
soon to be substantially reformed), our divorce law (radically reformed in 
1979), and our civil and criminal procedure (the product of a massive 
transplantation from England and grafted onto the Roman-Dutch substan-
tive law). In a sense, our entire mixed system is a challenge to these hypo-
theses and a field for developing new ones.83 
The adaptability of fundamental institutions 
One subject on which South African academic lawyers (and even future 
judges of appeal) become very angry is the law of trustS.84 Perhaps this is 
because, as an aspect of English private law which receives great attention 
from foreign lawyers, it also generates great resentment? For my own part, 
I find the law of trusts a fascinating field for comparative law because it 
raises two vital theoretical questions: namely, just how basic are allegedly 
"basic" institutions; and if they are basic, does that mean they are incom-
patible with alien legal systems? These questions are not only of theoretical 
concern; they are of immediate importance for the task of legal unification 
and transplantation. The role to be played by the trust in modern European 
law is an obvious example. 65 
In England the trust has been called the "most characteristic product 
of English legal genius" j66 and Lord Denning described it as "one of the 
most fruitful trees in the orchard of English law". 67 On the other hand, a 
distinguished professor of comparative law at London has suggested that 
61"Legal Transplants and Law Reform" (1976) 92 LQR 79. Cf also Max Rheinstein 
International Encyclopaedia of the Social Science; Voir 9 & 10 sv "Comparative Law and 
Legal Systems" 209, where it is suggested that, if anything, public law is less "system-
bound" than private law. See also the opening remarks in John H Beckstrom's "Trans-
plantation of Legal Systems: An Early Report on the Reception of Western Laws in 
Ethiopia" (1973) 21 Am] Comp L 557. 
uFor an attempt to show that their views are reconcilable, at least in part, see Eric Stein 
"Uses, Misuses - and Nonuses of Comparative Law" (1977) 72 Northweilern UL RIll 
198. 
63More hypotheses are proposed by Watson in his Legal Trallsplants Ch 16 and his "Com-
parative Law and Legal Change" (1978) 37 Cambridge LJ 313, 321ff. 
USee eg the references cited in Professor HJ Erasmus's book review: (1977) 40 THRHR 
107,107-8. 
USee eg AG Chloros "Principle, Reason and Policy in the Development of European 
Law" (1968) 17 ICLQ 849, 872/f. 
86Zweigert & Katz op cit (n 2) 275 (quoting Keeton). 
67Lord Denning The Due Process of Law (1980) 235. 
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98 XVI CILSA 1983 
the institution has now fulfilled its purpose and "ought to be placed upon 
semi-retirement like a much decorated general". 68 Being the product of the 
historical distinction between legal and equitable jurisdiction in England, 
it is treated as a fundamental institution of English law which illustrates the 
unique features of the common law. 69 The flexibility of the concept and its 
distinction between legal and equitable ownership seem strange to a con-
tinentallawyer. Maitland reports that Gierke once remarked to him that he 
did not understand the trust, that it was a concept quite beyond the frame-
work of European legal thought. 70 All this would seem to imply that the 
trust is a unique institution tied to the common law. 
Functionally speaking, this is, of course, absurd. No civilized society 
could operate properly without legal institutions which perform the func-
tions served by the trust. There are a number of analogues to be found, for 
example, during the various stages of Roman law, in Germanic, Roman-
Dutch and modern European law.71 What is really remarkable about the 
trust is that it constitutes an exception to the general style of the common 
law in that it is a unified, highly flexible concept. There does not seem to be 
a clear, single analogy in modern European law or even Roman-Dutch 
law.72 Ironically, the conceptual formulation of ownership in the modern 
European codes constitutes a factor which to some extent inhibits reception 
of the trust idea as a single institution;73 and this would seem to lend some 
force to the suggestion I raised earlier that modern European law might not 
be quite so compatible with our law as many seem to think. 
In South Mrica a battle has raged over the true nature of our trust. 
Whatever the motives of those who on both sides would seek to claim it as 
their own, such chauvinism should certainly not be a part of scholarly 
comparative law. Our law of trusts74 has grown in a bed of Roman-Dutch 
law; but in its formative stages of development, like it or not, it was nur-
tured by judges who borrowed heavily, if not the details, then the ideas75 
88Chloros op cit (n 65) 872. 
BDZweigert & Katz (op cit (n 2) 274-284) and David & Brierly (op &it (n 12) 322-327) 
each use the example of the trust to illustrate their discussions of the peculiar charac-
teristics of English law. 
70See Zweigert & Katz op &it (n 2) 275. 
71See eg Joaquin Garrigues "Law of Trusts" (1953) 2 Am] Comp L 25; Vera Bolgar 
"Why no Trusts in the Civil Law?" (1953) 2 Am] Comp L 304; and especially William 
F Fratcher International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law Vol VI Ch 11 "Trust" 84ff. 
72As the late Professor Beinart's extensive review of the trust in Roman and Roman-
Dutch law reveals: see B Beinart "Trusts in Roman and Roman-Dutch Law" (1980) 1 
Journal of Legal Hiltory 6. 
?aCf Bolgar op &it (n 71) 210fI"; cf Fratcher op &it (n 71) 87-88. 
"See esp HR Hahlo "The Trust in South African Law" (1960) 2 Inter-American L Rev 
229, reprinted in (1961) 78 SAL] 195; Beinart op &it (n 72); and Tony Honore The 
South African Law of TruItI 2ed (1976). 
7GBeinart puts it thus: " ... the actual number of rules taken over from the English law 
has not been very great. The rules and practices of the English law served mainly as 
valuable models, and as guides, as an indirect source, and sometimes acted as a spur 
to build up a functioning and effective trust institution in South Africa" (op cit (n 72) 
44); "The English law has served as a model and acted as a spur to the courts and to the 
legislature to refurbish Roman and Roman-Dutch juridical institutions which some-
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Comparative law in a mixed legal system 99 
of English law; and it was first used by South Africans of British descent. 78 
Now, however, it has evolved into an institution which is unique, "a mixture 
of English, Roman-Dutch and indigenous South African rules ... It is, 
source-wise, ius tripertitum but, in its end product, ius civile".77 It differs in 
many respects from its common law counterpart. 78 
What is of interest, therefore, is the fact that the trust can be adopted 
and harmonised with civilian law; and this must surely be of great concern, 
not only to comparatists but also to legal unificationists. 79 Here, too, there 
seems to be fascinating parallels in Scots law80 and other mixed jurisdictions, 
such as Quebec81 and Louisiana. 82 These are, to me, much more academi-
cally interesting questions than what our law of trusts ought to be. That can 
safely be left to the Law Reform Commission and those lawyers interested in 
law reform first and foremost. 
Concluding remarks 
The questions raised in these three examples go directly to the heart of 
legal theory. Answering the sort of questions they raise must surely be a 
dominant concern of legal science, and, especially, pure comparative law. 
Our legal system is simply bursting with further blends in need of explora-
tion by means of a similar approach, if only we would desist from prose-
lytism. Perhaps it could be said that the sort of comparative law which I 
have advocated is only concerned with the past, with what has happened in 
our legal system, whereas the purist/pragmatist debate is at least concerned 
with the future, the direction which our law should take. Sometimes, how-
ever, it is necessary to look back dispassionately in order to move forward. 
We have a fine tradition of legal scholarship and interest in comparative law; 
and many different ideological and doctrinal perspectives concerning the 
nature of law. Our courts are beginning to demonstrate an exciting trend 
towards theoretical analysis. These factors, coupled with the mixed nature 
of our legal system, create an ideal climate for the cultivation of pure 
comparative law. 
times were not as pervasive in their operation as their English law counterparts, and 
which may otherwise have remained dormant or unextended in South Africa" (op til 
(n 43) 29-30). 
nCf Honore op cit (n 74) 11; Beinart op rit (n 72) 8-10. 
77Honore op cit (n 74) 13-14. 
78See especially Hahlo op rit (n 74) passim; Tony Honore op ril (n 74) 12-13 and passim; 
Beinart op cil (n 72) 44, and op rit (n 43) 21-30. 
nCf Beinart op cil (n 72) 44. An excellent study which heads in this direction is Alexander 
McCall-Smith's "Comparative Aspects of the Rights of the Beneficiary in the South 
African Trust" (1972) 5 CILSA 188. 
80See eg TB Smith "Trusts and Fiduciary Relationships in the Law of Scotland" in 
Smith op cit (n 48) 198; and cf McCall-Smith op cit (n 79) 204ff; Fratcher op cit (n 71) 
93-94. 
BlSee eg Fratcher op cit (n 71) 94--96; Yves Caron "The Trust in Quebec" (1920) 25 
MrGiII LJ 421. 
82See eg Fratcher op cit (n 71) 98-99; Gerald Le Van "Louisiana Counterparts to Legal 
and Equitable Title" (1981) 41 Louiriana L Rev 1177. For an interesting general article 
on the trust as it has been adapted outside of England, see KW Ryan "The Reception 
of the Trust" (1961) 10 ICLQ 265. 
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